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AUTHORITY: AN HOMMAGE TO JACQUES 
DERRIDA AND MARY QUAINTANCE 
Arthur J. Jacobson* 
In thinking how to remember Jacques Derrida and that marvelous 
moment in which we were privileged to hear and to read his and Mary 
Quaintance’s contributions to “Deconstruction and the Possibility of 
Justice,” I reread Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of 
Authority.”1  That text appears in the Cardozo Law Review, with 
Derrida’s French on the left-hand pages and Quaintance’s English 
translation of it on the facing right-hand pages.  At the conference 
Derrida read from Quaintance’s English text.2 
Upon reflection, I noticed a small irregularity, of no apparent 
significance, in its very first sentence.  The French text reads (pardon 
my French): “C’est ici un devoir, je dois m’adresser à vous en anglais 
(à prononcer en français puis en anglais en soulignant adresse).”3  A 
direct translation would read: “This is an obligation, I must address 
myself to you in English (to be spoken in French, then in English, 
emphasizing address).”  But Quaintance did not translate what Derrida 
wrote.  Instead, she translated what, from her perspective in the moment 
she prepared the translation, he would speak: “C’est ici un devoir, je 
dois m’adresser à vous en anglais.  This is an obligation, I must address 
myself to you in English.”4  Think about it.  Her published translation 
reports her response to Derrida’s instruction rather than the instruction 
 
 *  Max Freund Professor of Litigation & Advocacy, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.  I 
am indebted to Peter Goodrich for reading and commenting brilliantly upon a prior draft, and to 
Paul Shupack for helping me see that everything was even more complicated than I had thought. 
 1 Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”, 11 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 919 (Mary Quaintance trans., 1990).  
 2 Actually, Derrida read only the first part of Quaintance’s text, though he had the entire text 
distributed to the audience.  He read the second part at a colloquium organized by Saul 
Friedlander at the University of California at Los Angeles on Nazism and the ‘Final Solution’: 
Probing the Limits of Representation.  Derrida added an introduction and conclusion to the 
second part for that occasion, which were not initially included in the text he distributed at the 
Cardozo event.  The editors of the Cardozo Law Review decided to publish the UCLA 
introduction and conclusion as footnotes, they say, at the beginning and end of the second part.  
See Derrida, supra note 1, at 921 (editorial note).  They do indeed publish the introduction as a 
note, but the conclusion is published as a “Post-scriptum,” not as a note.  Id. at 1040.  See also 
note 40 infra. 
 3 Derrida, supra note 1, at 920.  Derrida repeats this trope, in slightly altered form, later in 
the essay.  Id. at 922. 
 4 Id. at 921. 
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itself.  She prepared the translation for Derrida to read out loud, not as a 
“faithful” rendering of the French text.  In effect, Quaintance gave 
priority to the spoken over the written, a priority she need not have 
given, at least in the published version of her text, and one that Derrida, 
as we know, rejects.  And she did this, ironically, with Derrida’s sly 
acquiescence.5 
But more.  By suppressing Derrida’s French parenthetical, 
Quaintance altered his written text.  She created a difference that 
appears in the written text, laying the English translation side-by-side 
with the original French, but not in Derrida’s spoken remarks.  We 
could not know this at the time, for we had only Quaintance’s text in 
front of us.  It was only later, when Derrida’s text was published 
alongside hers, that we could see the trace of this difference.  Our 
awareness of the difference had to be deferred.  Just as in différance. 
We are left to wonder.  Did Derrida instruct Quaintance to create 
this difference, this little play of différance?  Or, did he leave her a 
decision, whether to follow what he wrote or what he said?  This may 
not have been a difficult decision when she was preparing the text for 
Derrida to read aloud, but must have given Quaintance at least a 
moment’s pause after Derrida had spoken.  At the time of the 
conference, it would have been perfectly appropriate for her to prepare 
the English text, as she did, for Derrida to read out loud, since that was 
the project immediately before them.  But was it also appropriate to use 
that very same text, prepared as it was for a one-off event, to effect the 
altogether different project of publication recto the French? 
At other places in his text, Derrida does appear to be giving his 
translator instructions.  At more than one point, Derrida writes out 
English words that translate a French phrase; he follows “la violence 
conservatrice” with a parenthetical containing the English words 
“lawpreserving violence,”6 and “faire la loi” with “making the law.”7  
At several points he writes out English words translating words or 
phrases in Walter Benjamin’s Zur Kritik der Gewalt.8  At these points 
he presents Benjamin’s text three times, first in his own French 
translation, then in the original German, then in Edmund Jephcott’s 
English translation.9  All these appear to be instructions to the 
translator—why else would Derrida bother to include Jephcott?—
instructions for which Derrida leaves a trace in the text.  But in the first 
sentence of Force of Law he leaves no trace of an instruction for 
 
 5 In a note on the first page of Quaintance’s translation, Derrida thanks Sam Weber “for his 
help in the final revision of this text.”  Id. 
 6 Id. at 1004. 
 7 Id. at 922. 
 8 Id. at 1006, 1020, 1024, 1030, 1032. 
 9 WALTER BENJAMIN, REFLECTIONS: ESSAYS, APHORISMS, AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITINGS 
(Edmund Jephcott trans., Peter Demetz ed., 1986). 
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handling what was, after all, a trap he had laid, a dilemma he had posed, 
for his translator. 
In laying his trap, in posing his dilemma, Derrida was exercising 
power, the power of an author.  He was not alone in this; Quaintance 
too had power, the power of a translator.  We can see the traces that 
Quaintance left of her power, her refractory rebellion against Derrida’s 
bootless instructions.  Take but one example.  Derrida is quoting from 
Benjamin.  His text reads: “La police est ignoble parce que dans son 
autorité ‘la séparation de la violence fondatrice et de la violence 
conservatrice est suspendue (aufgehoben)’ (in ihr die Trennung von 
rechtsetzender und rechtserhaltender Gewalt aufgehoben ist,) ‘in this 
authority the separation of lawmaking and lawpreserving is 
suspended.’”10  Her text reads: “The police are ignoble because in their 
authority ‘the separation of the violence that founds and the violence 
that conserves is suspended’ (in ihr die Trennung von rechtsetzender 
und rechtserhaltender Gewalt aufgehoben ist, ‘in this authority the 
separation of lawmaking and lawpreserving is suspended.’”11  Unlike 
her concealment of the instruction Derrida placed in the first sentence of 
Force of Law, Quaintance does let us see what appears to be his 
instruction about how to translate Benjamin’s text into English.  And 
then she ignores it.  She gives Benjamin’s text a translation entirely 
different from the one Derrida supplied.  (She also leaves out the 
parenthesis containing “aufgehoben” after “suspendue,” and ignores 
Derrida’s repetition of an instruction first given only two pages before 
to translate “la violence conservatrice” into “lawpreserving violence”—
an instruction she also ignored the first time he gave it.12)  She thus 
displays Derrida’s instruction together with her rebellion against it.  Or, 
perhaps she is simply trying to render Derrida’s French translation of 
Benjamin faithfully into English.  But even while being faithful in one 
sense, she is being faithless in another: Rendering Derrida’s French 
faithfully into English is not what Derrida told her to do.  Or, perhaps he 
did tell her.  But again, he left no trace of the instruction, if he did. 
There are other ways Quaintance breaks her contract with Derrida.  
He engaged her to translate.  Sometimes, even when a perfectly 
serviceable English word or phrase is available, she refuses to use it and 
just repeats the French.  For example, Derrida writes: “Si l’ordre du 
droit se manifeste pleinement dans la possibilité de la peine de mort, 
abolir celle-ci, ce n’est pas toucher à un dispositif parmi d’autres, c’est 
 
 10 Derrida, supra note 1, at 1006. 
 11 Id. at 1007. 
 12 Id. at 1004.  She also ignores his instruction to translate “faire la loi” as “making the law.”  
Id. at 923.  She translates it as “laying down the law,” but this time she does not carry over 
Derrida’s version into the English text, effectively concealing it.  Id.  See supra text 
accompanying note 7.   
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désavouer le principe même du droit.”13  Quaintance translates: “If the 
legal system fully manifests itself in the possibility of the death penalty, 
to abolish the penalty is not to touch upon one dispositif among others, 
it is to disavow the very principle of law.”14  Dispositif is not a 
mysterious word.  It is not a term of art for Derrida, like différance, that 
must be carried over into the English.  Nor is it a technical term peculiar 
to the French legal system.  “Dispositif” describes the purview terms of 
an act or decree, the scope or limit of a statute.15  So one could simply 
translate “one dispositif” by “one statute’s scope” or “one statute’s 
limit.”  There was no need to leave this term, bound not to be known to 
most of Derrida’s anglophone readers, in the French.16 
But, of course, leaving a certain portion of the text in French was 
exactly what Derrida did in the very first sentence of Force of Law.  
“C’est ici un devoir, je dois m’adresser à vous en anglais.  This is an 
obligation, I must address myself to you in English.”  Just as Derrida 
reports that he has a contractual obligation to the organizers of the 
conference to speak in English, he violates his obligation by speaking 
his very first words in French.  Derrida breaches what he later refers to 
as his “contract” in the very act of reporting it.17  He reports it, at first, 
in his own language, in French, so that many in the audience would not 
know that he is reporting it, not understanding French.  And when he 
repeats the French in English they would not understand that he was 
directly translating for them the plain meaning of the French.  They 
would know only that he was saying something in French and then 
saying something else in English.  He would be obscuring from them, 
the very ones who had to know it, that a translation had just taken place.  
And for those who did understand French, who knew that the French 
was followed by an English translation, he would be making it seem 
that it was his translation that he was reading, not Quaintance’s: he was 
speaking in French, then he was saying the same words again in 
English.18  It is only later, when he is discussing the impossibility of 
translation, that Derrida discloses that the translator of the text was not 
 
 13 Derrida, supra note 1, at 1004. 
 14 Id. at 1005. 
 15 CASSELL’S FRENCH-ENGLISH ENGLISH-FRENCH DICTIONARY 259 (5th ed. 1951). 
 16 Quaintance leaves Derrida’s French word in the English text at several other points, often 
for very good reason.  See, e.g., Derrida, supra note 1, at 923 (droit, Je le dois, Je dois, juste).  
Several times, she leaves a phrase in French because Derrida obliquely directs it: “Il ne faut pas 
manquer d’adresse, dirais-je en français,” and “‘rendre la justice,’ comme on dit en français,”  
id. at 948, and “comme on dit en français, que ‘justice est faite.’”  Id. at 950.  
 17 Id. at 925. 
 18 Most or all members of the audience had photocopies of Derrida’s talk, which, as I recall, 
did indicate up front that Quaintance was the translator.  And most members of the audience were 
dutifully following the photocopied text as Derrida spoke, as if they were following a score at the 
opera.  But some were not, and the point remains that Derrida set up a situation where 
misimpression was possible. 
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he but Quaintance, and corrects the initial misimpression he may have 
created.19  In his very first sentence, then, Derrida commits two 
injustices, both quickly mended: he breaches his contract with the 
organizers by speaking in French, and he seems to claim credit for the 
translation, when credit, according to all the traditions of the 
relationship between translator and author, must go to Quaintance. 
So Quaintance was doing neither more nor less when she breached 
her contract with Derrida than what Derrida was planning to do, or had 
already done, in breaching his contract with the organizers.  She was 
doing neither more nor less when she created her misimpression of the 
literal words in Derrida’s first sentence than Derrida had done, when he 
created his misimpression in that sentence about the identity of the 
translator.  She was translating not just the essay, but the moral 
condition, the behavior, of its author.  She was translating Derrida, as 
well as his text. 
This struggle, this polemos, between Derrida and his contumacious 
translator for control of the text puts in question, puts in play, the 
subject of Derrida’s authority, his authority as an author.  He does sign, 
he does take responsibility for both texts, the French and the English, 
the one he wrote and the one he did not, the one that instructs his 
translator and the one by which his translator compels him.  But in the 
place where he signs, in the last sentence of the essay, as if to 
emphasize her recognition of Derrida’s authority, as if to turn over the 
reigns to Derrida once he takes responsibility as an author, Quaintance 
makes a second omission, to mirror and to complement the omission 
with which her translation of the essay began.  The last sentence in the 
French text belongs to Benjamin, and Derrida presents it three times: 
“‘Die göttliche Gewalt, welche Insignium und Siegel, niemals Mittel 
heiliger Vollstreckung ist, mag die waltende heissen’: ‘La violence 
divine, qui est insigne et sceau, non point jamais moyen d’exécution 
sacrée, peut être appelée souveraine (die waltende heissen).  (‘Divine 
violence, which is the sign and seal but never the means of sacred 
execution, may be called sovereign violence (die waltende heissen).’)”20  
The translator presents Benjamin’s sentence only twice, once in German 
and once in Jephcott’s translation of the German into English, now and 
for the only time following the instructions implicit in Derrida’s text to 
the letter. 
How does Derrida receive this gift of recognition from his 
translator?  (Or is he getting instead a well-earned recompense?)  Just 
before Derrida quotes and translates into French and English 
Benjamin’s last sentence, he writes: “But who signs?  It is God, the 
Wholly Other, as always, it is the divine violence that always will have 
 
 19 Derrida, supra note 1, at 925. 
 20 Id. at 1036. 
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preceded but also will have given all the first names: ‘Die göttliche 
Gewalt . . . .’”21  He takes responsibility for the French text by signing 
it.  But was he also taking responsibility for Quaintance’s translation?  
After all, his name appears in the same way at the end of both.  Did he 
also sign the English text, or is what appears to be his signature just 
Quaintance’s translation of his French signature, which he permitted her 
perforce to affix to the English text?  His French signature then is the 
genuine signature; the English, a signature by sufferance, the signature 
of a monarch who, for better or for worse, must listen to his counselors 
and can do no other.  He must take responsibility for a text over which 
he has not even the semblance of control.  He must acquiesce in 
whatever fate has in store.  He, like Benjamin, must recognize the 
sovereignty of divine violence.  It is God who is the author; God, who 
signs.  It is God, the “Wholly Other.”  For the ultimate responsibility for 
the text belongs neither to Derrida nor to his translator.  His translator 
takes instruction from his text, but, like any reader, may not understand 
what it is telling.  She too must acquiesce in whatever fate has in store.  
The translation will be governed by “the law of an implicit third.”22 
Thus Derrida’s text points us in the end to God’s authorship, God’s 
authority.  The end of Derrida’s text formed the beginning of mine in 
the same conference volume, The Idolatry of Rules: Writing Law 
According to Moses, with Reference to Other Jurisprudences.23  Mine 
was an exploration of God’s authority, His authorship of the Five Books 
and therefore of the universe.  Moses wrote the Five Books, but only as 
God’s amanuensis.  Though Moses’ text refers only once to God 
Himself writing (the tablets on Mt. Sinai), the narrative of the entire 
history of the universe is God’s writing.  God writes by speaking and 
cannot speak without writing; His speech is immediately transcribed in 
the universe, as the universe.  The universe and its history are God’s 
writing.  The world is text.  God’s thoughts are its laws.  Man is in the 
unique position in that universe of having been made in the image of 
God.  As God’s image, in order fully to be that image, he must 
collaborate with God in the ongoing creation of the universe.  He too 
must have thoughts that are laws.  He too must write, must be an author. 
The only authority in this way of thinking is the authority of an 
author.24  Only one who creates a text, leaves a record, has authority.  
That is why parents have authority over their children: they create their 
children, make their children in their image, and their children are the 
 
 21 Id. at 1037. 
 22 Id. at 949. 
 23 Arthur J. Jacobson, The Idolatry of Rules: Writing Law According to Moses, with 
Reference to Other Jurisprudences, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1079 (1990). 
 24 This was Spinoza’s thesis as well, in his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.  See Arthur J. 
Jacobson, Law Without Authority: Sources of the Welfare State in Spinoza’s Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 669, 684-85 (2003). 
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record of that creation.  That is why God is the Master of the Universe: 
He creates and sustains the universe and its laws, and the universe and 
its laws record that creation.  That is why, more specifically, Moses 
recognizes God as the Sovereign of his polity: God wrote the novel that 
establishes its political and legislative structure, that gives its structure 
authority. 
And the novel displays God as its author.  God appears in it as the 
narrative voice in both its registers.25  As the omniscient narrator, He is 
Elohim, or “Rulers” (usually mistranslated as “God”26).  He rules by 
creating the universe and governing it by law, the physical laws of 
nature and the seven laws that God revealed to Adam and Noah that are 
requisite for a minimum state of civilization (the Noachide 
Commandments).27  He is the guarantor of the efficacy of those laws, 
hence justice.28  As the narrator who is a character in the novel, He is 
Yud-Hay-Vov-Hay (the Tetragrammaton, usually mistranslated as 
“Lord”), which Maimonides translates as the Greek “ousia,” hence 
“being” or “existence.”29  He is the result of creation, the subject of its 
laws.  He creates the capacity for law, the possibility of the legal 
subject.  He is man’s interlocutor.  He can be persuaded to relax the 
efficacy of His laws, to show mercy.30 
Derrida, like many who live in the shadow of Spinoza, does not 
have the faith that we can be partners with God in the ongoing creation 
of a lawful universe.  He does not believe that we can be authors in the 
sense that God is an author.  He does not propound any doctrine of 
authority.31  Only God can sign, and He is “Wholly Other.”  We can 
seem to sign, appear to take responsibility, just as Derrida seemed to 
sign, to take responsibility for Quaintance’s translation.  Nevertheless, 
because we are subject to fate, because we cannot know everything we 
need to know to be master of our fate, we can never in truth be 
responsible, never have authority.  Derrida would agree, I think, with 
 
 25 See Jacobson, supra note 23, at 1080. 
 26 See id. at 1081. 
 27 See NAHUM M. SARNA, THE JPS TORAH COMMENTARY: GENESIS 377 (1989) (“the 
minimal moral imperatives essential to the maintenance of an ordered and wholesome society”).  
For a precise and thorough account of the laws of Noah, see AARON LICHTENSTEIN, THE SEVEN 
LAWS OF NOAH (1981). 
 28 See Jacobson, supra note 23, at 1082 n.13. 
 29 See id. at 1081 n.12. 
 30 See id. at 1082 n.13. 
 31 For Derrida authority can be nothing other than self-authorization: “Since the origin of 
authority, the foundation or ground, the position of the law can’t by definition rest on anything 
but themselves, they are themselves a violence without ground.”  Derrida, supra note 1, at 943.  
He thus equates the “foundation” of law with its “self-authorization.”  Hence law as such 
(“droit”) and “legitimating or legitimated authority” (“l’autorité légitimante ou légitimée”) are 
deconstructible, where justice is not.  Indeed, the deconstructibility of authority and its associated 
concepts–law as such (“droit”), legality, legitimacy or legitimation–makes deconstruction 
possible.  Id. at 945. 
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the proposition that the only conceivable authority is the authority of an 
author, of the creator of a universe that is lawful to its core, that every 
other sort of authority is a submission to violence.  Where he parts 
company with Jewish tradition, however, is that he believes that only 
God can be a true author, only God can be at once just and merciful, 
only God can at once impose and relax the law.  We can take 
responsibility only for imposing law.  God’s attribute of mercy never 
even enters the mind of a Derrida or a Benjamin.  God appears in Zur 
Kritik der Gewalt and in Force of Law only as a figure of violence.  The 
only attribute of God available to us is the attribute of justice, so that 
every time we perform an act of what we may regard as mercy we are 
condemned to regard it as the imposition of a new law, not as a release 
from law.  Release from law is possible only to one who believes 
absolutely in freedom of the will, and the signal character of all modern 
and even post-modern thought, with the possible exception of Kant, is 
that it assumes one version or another of a law-bound universe and not 
freedom of the will.  For Derrida in particular the stumbling block 
against freedom of the will would be the laws of the unconscious. 
And how could it be otherwise after Spinoza?  In this sense, 
Derrida is Spinoza’s child.  Spinoza too believed in God’s authority, 
that God is the author of the universe and we, as individuals, are the 
authors of nothing.32  Spinoza rejected Hobbes’s position that we can be 
authors of the state, at least for the purpose of its juridical justification.33  
He rejected Hobbes’s very real belief—and all the more real because 
Hobbes framed this belief as myth—that God taught Adam how to 
name, and that Adam’s descendants could use this power to create 
political and legal structures of immense grandeur and power.34  
Spinoza would agree with Derrida that only God names, that we cannot 
name.35  But Derrida would certainly reject the tradition, running from 
Spinoza to Rousseau, that the state—inasmuch as it is the author of its 
citizens, inasmuch as it is their author through law, inasmuch as it trains 
them and nurtures them into having certain sorts of personalities, certain 
sorts of customs, certain allocations of roles—has authority.  In that 
sense, Spinoza and Rousseau have only one foot in the modern world.  
The other is planted firmly in the Biblical universe, in which states can 
have authority to the degree that they follow God’s law.  Of course, it is 
not God’s law that Spinoza and Rousseau expect states to follow, but 
they do entertain the inherent possibility of lawfulness.  Derrida does 
 
 32 See Jacobson, supra note 24, at 684-85. 
 33 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, OR THE MATTER, FORM, & POWER OF A 
COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL, at ch. 16 (Oxford Univ. Press 1909) (1651) (“Of 
Persons, Authors, and things Personated.”). 
 34 Id. at ch. 4 (“Of Speech.”). 
 35 Derrida, supra note 1, at 1037. 
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not. 
Nevertheless, we continue to impose law.  We are lawless 
creatures who are constantly imposing law.  Derrida wrestles with the 
awful consequences of this fact in the “Post-scriptum” to Force of Law, 
in both form and content perhaps the most difficult and mysterious 
moment in an altogether difficult and mysterious text.  In the “Post-
scriptum” Derrida imagines what Benjamin, following the logic of Zur 
Kritik der Gewalt, would have thought about the final solution, had he 
lived to know of it.  Benjamin, he says, would probably have 
understood the final solution to be “an extreme consequence” of the 
logic of Nazism.  Derrida associates this logic with the “totalitarian 
radicalization” of the logic of the state.  He associates it, as well, with 
the “radicalization and total extension” of mythic violence—that is to 
say, the violence that creates law and preserves it.  It was the 
“radicalization and total extension” of mythic violence that led 
eventually to “the whole judicial and state organization that marked the 
techno-industrial and scientific deployment of the ‘final solution.’”36 
The understanding of Nazism as a paragon of mythic violence 
suggests to Derrida what is “the most redoubtable, indeed (perhaps, 
almost) intolerable in this text,” which is “a temptation that it would 
leave open, and leave open notably to the survivors or the victims of the 
final solution . . . .”37  The temptation is to regard the holocaust as a 
manifestation of what is in every way the opposite of mythic violence: 
the violence that strikes without warning and kills without shedding 
blood, the violence that expiates, the violence that annihilates law 
instead of creating or preserving it.  It is this violence that Benjamin 
names “divine violence.”38  The holocaust may be understood as a 
manifestation of this divine violence because, in part, it revealed every 
state to be a more or less rigorous, more or less pitiless, more or less 
relentless realization of the logic “radicalized” by Nazism.39  After the 
holocaust, no state, ever again, can claim the mantle of lawfulness.  
That is Europe’s poisoned gift to humanity.  For us, God’s attribute of 
mercy is forever gone. 
And so here Derrida does not sign.  Everything in the “Post-
 
 36 Id. at 1041. 
 37 Id. at 1044. 
 38 Id. at 1027-29. 
 39 Id. at 1041.  Saul Bellow makes substantially the same point in his novel, The Dean’s 
December.  For Bellow all government is, at its core, oriental despotism.  The only difference 
between Bellow’s Chicago and Ceasescu’s Bucharest is that the governing class in Chicago takes 
the trouble to veil its despotism (both from itself and those it governs) with the rhetoric of equal 
respect and concern.  The governing class in Bucharest did not.  The American State was 
immensely stronger, as a consequence, because citizens look to it to supply what citizens in 
Bucharest sought from family and friends.  Nonetheless, despite the illusions of its citizens, the 
truth of the American State remains the same: oriental despotism.  And because Americans are 
confused about this truth, family and friends in the United States are one’s worst enemies. 
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scriptum” comes after Derrida’s signature at the end of Force of Law 
proper.40  He is “terrified at the idea of an interpretation that would 
make of the holocaust an expiation and an indecipherable signature of 
the just and violent anger of God,”41 and so objects to it, refuses to take 
responsibility for it, won’t sign off on it, even though it is his 
interpretation of what Benjamin would say following a logic Derrida 
found in Benjamin’s text.  What is perhaps more important, however, is 
that the contents of the “Post-scriptum” put in question the very gesture 
of signing, of taking responsibility. 
For taking responsibility, even whilst knowing that one cannot be 
responsible, is a response to the demand for justice.  Signature avows 
the capacity to be a legal subject.  The holocaust discredited the idea of 
justice in both its manifestations—in the state as law, and God’s justice.  
It also proved that it was possible, indeed in one sense inevitable, to 
strip some group of humans of any potential for legal capacity.  (Think 
today of the unborn.)  Today each and every one of us faces the 
possibility, even the inevitability, that sooner or later what happened to 
Jews and homosexuals and Gypsies in Nazi Germany will happen to us; 
and at certain times, in certain places, such as Cambodia under the 
Khmer Rouge, that possibility is realized for almost all.  The gesture of 
signing, of taking responsibility, says that answering the demand for 
justice is worthwhile.  If Derrida, speaking for Benjamin, is right about 
the significance of the holocaust, that is no longer true.  And so Derrida 
releases himself from responsibility, both for the words he writes in 
Benjamin’s name, and also for responsibility altogether.  He releases 
himself from responsibility for responsibility. 
He also releases Mary Quaintance.  The French text for the “Post-
scriptum,” assuming Derrida wrote it in French, assuming he wrote it at 
all, is simply not there.  We have no way of holding Quaintance to 
account for her translation of the “Post-scriptum.”  We have no way of 
telling whether she did justice to Derrida.  Her translation is beyond 
reproach.  As are today both Mary Quaintance and Jacques Derrida. 
 
 
 40 Remember, the “Post-scriptum” does not properly belong to the text of Force of Law.  It is 
a writing-after, belonging to a bastardized version of part of Force of Law, the part that was not 
read at the Cardozo conference, but was read at the UCLA conference later on, and included the 
“Post-scriptum” as its conclusion.  See supra note 2.  Of course, Derrida has just got through 
describing Benjamin’s discussion of bastardy at the end of Zur Kritik der Gewalt.  Derrida, supra 
note 1, at 1037. 
 41 Derrida, supra note 1, at 1045. 
